

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

SUBJECT: SE-10: PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A "VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS" (VFC)

See Digo for Consideration by the Board of National Estimates

THE PROBLEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To estimate the probable Communist reactions to the organization of a Volunteer Freedom Corps composed of units of Satellite Europeans attached to the US Army and under the command of American officers. This program for a VFC would be accompanied by an intensive propaganda campaign directed to the Satellites to encourage recruiting.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 0 (991)
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE: 27 JAN 91 REVIEWER: 018557

JOB NO. JO12

BOX NO. _____

FOLDER NO. _____

TOTAL DOCS HEREIN _____

1. We believe that the Kremlin will probably consider the organization of a VFC as part of a long-term US program to free the European Satellites from Soviet control. The Kremlin will almost certainly regard a VFC as another indication that the US is preparing to attack the Bloc, but we estimate that the Kremlin will not consider establishment of a VFC as evidence that an attack upon the Bloc is imminent.

2. The Kremlin ^{will} almost certainly ~~will~~ regard a VFC as an insignificant military force, ^{and} ~~will~~ estimate that the US will not be able to ^{afford} ~~maintain~~ a VFC into a large and effective military force. At least initially, it will probably regard a VFC as a system for the recruitment of agents. ^{for} ~~It will probably expect an increase of border violations and of espionage and sabotage activities within the Bloc Satellites.~~

3. On the other hand, the Kremlin ~~and the Satellite regimes~~ will almost certainly consider a VFC as an effective US psychological weapon providing a firm ^{commitment} ~~guarantee~~ of US intentions to free the Satellite peoples. If a VFC should be used effectively in a UN action in Korea, or in some other local operation outside of Europe, the Kremlin would probably ^{estimate that} ~~be seriously~~ ^{such an action would probably adversely affect Kremlin control over} ~~be alarmed at the impact such action would have on the populations of the Satellites, and~~ ~~expand in the non-Communist world.~~

4. The Kremlin probably estimates that ^{organizing} ~~the organization of~~ a VFC will be difficult, and that maintaining such a corps over a long period of time will constitute a hazardous program for the US, failure in which would seriously hamper ~~US~~ ^{US military warfare directed against the Bloc} ~~US efforts to detach the Satellites from the Bloc~~. It may also estimate that the establishment of a VFC will increase the strains upon relations between the US and its allies and that the psychological advantage gained by the US among the Satellite peoples will be outweighed by the ~~disension~~ ^{disension} created within the Allies.

5. We do not believe that the establishment of a VFC and the accompanying propaganda campaign will lead the Kremlin either to adopt courses of action involving grave risk of war or involving concessions designed to relax current tensions. However, the Kremlin will almost certainly ^{give the impression of greater alarm than it actually feels} ~~be alarmed at US intentions~~ ^{than it actually is}. The Communists will attempt to strengthen the controls over flight from the Satellites. They will almost certainly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

relations + friends
 use terror against ~~friends and relatives~~ of members of the VFC, *a* ~~and they~~ *and they* ~~if a VFC attacks members~~
~~of the Satellite armed forces,~~ *the Communist* will ~~also~~ *increase* their restrictions upon
~~these forces, particularly the air forces.~~ *They* ~~The Communists~~ *also* will seek to infiltrate a VFC
~~and to destroy it by terrorizing and intimidating its members.~~ *its effectiveness*

7.6. The Communists will almost certainly reply to the US program with a heavy propaganda
 barrage, within and beyond the Bloc, *along the lines currently being used against the Koreans*
~~in international organizations and all the time.~~ The Satell-
 ites regimes will probably bear the burden of the campaign within international organizations
 such as the UN. *charging interference in their internal affairs + peaceful pursuits + the Communists*
~~The Communist campaign will attempt to label their action as preparation~~
~~for war, and labeling the US action as preparation for attack.~~
~~and to reduce the effectiveness~~
~~of Western charges against the Communists.~~ *particularly those in*
 The national Communist Parties *of Western Europe*
 will ~~probably~~ give the VFC a high priority in their propaganda. *[outside the Bloc]*

8. The governments of those Satellites whose nationals are organized into VFC units
~~may threaten to break diplomatic relations with the US when the US campaign is announced.~~
~~These governments will~~ *may possibly even* ~~break diplomatic relations with the US when the campaign~~
~~gets under way, and the threat of~~ *may possibly even* ~~eliminating all~~
 US connections in Eastern Europe in its effort to check the US program.

9.8. If a VFC program should fail, the Communists would make sustained use of that
 failure to convince the Satellite peoples that the US was unable to help them *that the US*
 interest in freeing them. *and would lose*